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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
Richard C. Crandon appeals his sentence following his 
guilty plea to one count of receiving child pornography. 
Crandon seeks to vacate his sentence on three grounds. He 
argues that the District Court erred when it: (1) ordered 
him to pay restitution for psychiatric medical expenses of 
his victim; (2) attached a special condition to his supervised 
release that limits his computer use; and (3) applied the 
cross-reference set forth in U.S.S.G. S 2G2.2(c)(1) when 
determining his base offense level under the Sentencing 
Guidelines. We will affirm the order of restitution and 
special condition of supervised release, but vacate and 
remand for reconsideration the application of the cross- 
reference. 
 
I. 
 
In early 1997, Crandon, then a 39-year-old New Jersey 
resident, met a 14-year-old girl from Minnesota on the 
Internet. After communicating through electronic mail for 
several months, Crandon traveled to Minnesota, in July 
1997, where he met the girl and engaged in sexual relations 
with her. During this three-day visit, Crandon took 
approximately 48 photographs of the girl. Two of the photos 
were sexually explicit, including one depicting Crandon and 
the girl engaging in oral sex. After returning to New Jersey, 
Crandon mailed the undeveloped film to Seattle FilmWorks, 
a mail-order film processor located in Seattle, Washington, 
for developing. He later received the developed photos in 
New Jersey. 
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Following the July visit, Crandon and the girl spoke on 
the telephone regularly and discussed Crandon returning to 
Minnesota to bring her back to New Jersey with him. In 
August 1997, Crandon returned to Minnesota, picked up 
the girl and began to drive back to New Jersey. After 
traveling as far as Pennsylvania, Crandon and the girl 
learned that the police were searching for them. Crandon 
then placed the girl on a bus back to Minnesota. Upon his 
return to New Jersey, Crandon was arrested and the 
sexually explicit pictures from the July visit were seized. 
 
Some three weeks later, the girl was admitted to a 
hospital psychiatric ward for suicidal ideation. She 
remained in the hospital for 50 days before being 
transferred to a long-term, in-patient psychiatric facility 
where she remained until the date of the sentencing. The 
hospital expenses incurred by the girl's mother totaled 
$57,050.96 (including medical and miscellaneous 
expenses). Prior to this incident, the girl had never sought 
or received mental health treatment. 
 
Crandon pleaded guilty to one count of receiving child 
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2252(a)(2). At 
sentencing, the District Court noted that section 2G2.2 of 
the Sentencing Guidelines provides a base offense level of 
17 for a conviction of receiving child pornography. However, 
the District Court applied section 2G2.2's cross-reference, 
thereby invoking section 2G2.1, which raised the base 
offense level to 25.1 
 
The District Court imposed a 78-month sentence and a 
three-year term of supervised release. The term of 
supervised release included a special condition directing 
that Crandon not "possess, procure, purchase or otherwise 
obtain access to any form of computer network, bulletin 
board, Internet, or exchange format involving computers 
unless specifically approved by the United States Probation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 2G2.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines applies to "Sexually 
Exploiting a Minor by Production of Sexually Explicit Visual or Printed 
Material; Custodian Permitting Minor to Engage in Sexually Explicit 
Conduct; Advertisement for Minors to Engage in Production." U.S.S.G. 
S 2G2.1. 
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Office." The court also ordered Crandon to pay restitution 
in the amount of $57,050.96. 
 
Crandon now appeals. We have appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. 
 
We address first the claim that the sentencing court 
inappropriately imposed an order of restitution which 
covered the costs of the girl's 50-day hospitalization and 
related miscellaneous expenses. While we exercise plenary 
review over whether an award of restitution is permitted 
under law, we review specific awards of restitution for 
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Graham, 72 F.3d 
352, 355 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
The mandatory restitution provision of the Protection of 
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act requires awarding 
the full amount of the victim's losses suffered as a 
proximate result of the offense. See 18 U.S.C. S 2259(b)(3). 
Crandon argues that: (1) his conduct was not the proximate 
cause of the victim's losses; (2) even if it was, it was only 
part of the cause; therefore, the sentencing court should 
have ordered restitution for only a portion of the losses; and 
(3) his economic circumstances do not allow for payment 
now or in the foreseeable future; as such, only "nominal 
periodic payments" should have been ordered. 
 
We disagree. Congress mandated broad restitution for a 
minor victim following an offender's conviction of federal 
child sexual exploitation and abuse offenses. The plain 
language of the statute clearly indicates that full restitution 
was warranted under these circumstances. 
 
A. Proximate Cause 
 
The District Court concluded by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Crandon's conduct was the proximate cause 
of the victim's losses. See Graham, 72 F.3d at 356 ("The 
government has the burden of demonstrating by a 
preponderance of the evidence the amount of loss sustained 
by the victim."). In reaching its conclusion, the District 
Court relied upon the expert opinion of Jodi Pritchard, a 
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licensed social worker and treatment coordinator at the 
long-term psychiatric facility where the girl was treated. In 
a letter to the court, Ms. Pritchard stated that Crandon's 
contacts with the victim were "a significant contributing 
factor in [the girl's] worsening depression and suicide 
ideation." Supp. App. at 8. The government also presented 
a report of the psychiatrist who treated the girl and 
concluded that Crandon's conduct "exacerbated" her 
depression and led to her hospitalization. See Supp. App. at 
16. This evidence was unrebutted. 
 
Crandon challenges the court's consideration of Ms. 
Pritchard's opinion (though not the psychiatrist's opinion) 
on the ground that she is not a medical doctor. This type 
of challenge has been repeatedly rejected. See Waldorf v. 
Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 625 (3d Cir. 1998) (permitting social 
worker to serve as expert witness regarding personal 
injury); Hammond v. International Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 
646, 653 (3d Cir. 1982) ("[U]nder Rule 702, an individual 
need possess no special academic credentials to serve as an 
expert witness . . . . `[P]ractical experience as well as 
academic training and credentials may be the basis of 
qualification (as an expert witness).' " (citation omitted)); see 
also Fed. R. Evid. 702. We also note the facts that the 
victim had never been treated for a mental health problem 
before the incident, sought medical treatment and required 
hospitalization shortly after the incident, and had been 
placed in a long-term psychiatric treatment center. The 
District Court properly considered these factors in addition 
to the opinions of Ms. Pritchard and the psychiatrist. 
 
Crandon also contends that his actions cannot be 
considered the proximate cause of the girl's losses because 
the government's mental health experts conceded that she 
may have suffered from pre-existing, untreated 
psychological problems prior to their relationship. Despite 
that reality, it was entirely reasonable for the District Court 
to conclude that the additional strain or trauma stemming 
from Crandon's actions was a substantial factor in causing 
the ultimate loss. We conclude that the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in concluding that Crandon's 
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conduct was the proximate cause of the victim's 
hospitalization.2 
 
B. Payment of Restitution 
 
Crandon also argues that neither his current economic 
circumstances nor those in the foreseeable future allow for 
payment in full; therefore, the District Court should have 
imposed "nominal periodic payments." The District Court, 
however, was required to impose mandatory restitution. See 
18 U.S.C. S 2259. The court was not permitted to consider 
Crandon's economic circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. 
S 2259(b)(4)(B) ("A court may not decline to issue an order 
under this section because of -- (i) the economic 
circumstances of the defendant."). After ordering full 
restitution, the court must set a payment schedule and 
may only order nominal periodic payments if the defendant 
proves indigency.3 In this case, the court noted that 
Crandon "is a man with a college education with some 
master's points . . . [his] financial future is not bereft of 
hope." App. at 92. These findings, which are not disputed, 
suggest that Crandon's potential earning capacity precludes 
a determination of indigency. Accordingly, we do notfind 
the imposition of full restitution costs to be an abuse of 
discretion. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Crandon also argues that he should only be required to pay restitution 
for "a percentage of the proximate cause." Appellant's Br. at 12. We note, 
however, that once proximate cause is established, the statute requires 
the court to order restitution for the "full amount of the victim's 
losses." 
18 U.S.C. S 2259(b)(1). There is nothing in the statute that provides for 
a proportionality analysis. 
 
3. The mandatory restitution provision specifies that enforcement of the 
order follow the guidelines set forth in section 3664. See 18 U.S.C. 
S 2259(b)(3). According to section 3664, after ordering full restitution, 
the 
court must set a payment schedule. See 18 U.S.C. S 3664(f)(2). In 
considering the manner and schedule of payment, the court is required 
to consider the defendant's financial resources, assets, projected income, 
and financial obligations. If the defendant's financial situation does 
"not 
allow the payment of any amount of a restitution order, and [does] not 
allow for the payment of the full amount of a restitution order in the 
foreseeable future under any reasonable schedule of payments," then the 
court can order nominal periodic payments. 18 U.S.C.S 3664(f)(3)(B). 
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III. 
 
We next address Crandon's challenge to the District 
Court's decision to limit his Internet access during his term 
of supervised release. We apply an abuse of discretion 
standard of review to the District Court's imposition of a 
special condition of supervised release. See United States v. 
Ritter, 118 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Schechter, 13 F.3d 1117, 1118 (7th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Chinske, 978 F.2d 557, 559-60 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 
As a part of Crandon's sentence, the District Court 
imposed the following condition of supervised release: 
 
       The defendant shall not possess, procure, purchase or 
       otherwise obtain access to any form of computer 
       network, bulletin board, Internet, or exchange format 
       involving computers unless specifically approved by the 
       U.S. Probation Office. 
 
App. at 11. Crandon contends that the condition 
unnecessarily infringes upon his liberty interests and bears 
no logical relation to his offense. 
 
A sentencing judge is given wide discretion in imposing 
supervised release. The validity of a condition of supervised 
release is governed by 18 U.S.C. S 3583. Pursuant to that 
statute, a District Court may order any appropriate 
condition to the extent it: 
 
       (1) is reasonably related to certain factors, including 
       (a) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 
       history and characteristics of the defendant, (b) 
       deterring further criminal conduct by the defendant, or 
       (c) protecting the public from further criminal conduct 
       by the defendant; [and] 
 
       (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is 
       reasonably necessary for the purposes of deterrence 
       and protection of the public . . . 
 
See 18 U.S.C. SS 3583(d), 3553(a). 
 
We believe that the District Court's condition restricting 
Internet access is reasonably related to Crandon's criminal 
activities, to the goal of deterring him from engaging in 
further criminal conduct, and to protecting the public. In 
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this case, Crandon used the Internet as a means to develop 
an illegal sexual relationship with a young girl over a period 
of several months. Given these compelling circumstances, it 
seems clear that the condition of release limiting Crandon's 
Internet access is related to the dual aims of deterring him 
from recidivism and protecting the public. 
 
Unquestionably, computer networks and the Internet will 
continue to become an omnipresent aspect of American life. 
As the U.S. Supreme Court observed in Reno v. Civil 
Liberties Union: 
 
       The Internet is "a unique and wholly new medium of 
       worldwide human communication." The Internet has 
       experienced "extraordinary growth." The number of 
       "host" computers -- those that store information and 
       relay communications -- increased from about 300 in 
       1981 to approximately 9,400,000 by . . . 1996. Roughly 
       60% of these hosts are located in the United States. 
       About 40 million people used the Internet [in 1996], a 
       number that is expected to mushroom to 200 million 
       by 1999. 
 
117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997) (citations omitted). 
 
Recognizing this, Crandon argues that as businesses 
continue to integrate computers and the Internet into the 
workplace, the special condition may hamper his 
employment opportunities upon release, as well as limit his 
freedoms of speech and association. However, in this case 
the restrictions on employment and First Amendment 
freedoms are permissible because the special condition is 
narrowly tailored and is directly related to deterring 
Crandon and protecting the public. See Ritter, 118 F.3d at 
504 ("even though supervised release restrictions may affect 
constitutional rights such as First Amendment protections, 
most restrictions are valid if directly related to advancing 
the individual's rehabilitation and to protecting the public 
from recidivism."). In fact, several other courts of appeal 
have upheld conditions which implicate fundamental rights. 
See e.g., Ritter, 118 F.3d at 502 (defendant convicted of 
embezzling from employer was required to notify present 
and future employers of his past crimes); United States v. 
Schechter, 13 F.3d 1117 (7th Cir. 1994) (defendant, a 
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computer consultant who had admitted to stealing $95,000 
from three employers was required as a condition of his 
supervised release, to notify all employers of his past 
crimes and current status on supervised release); United 
States v. Bortels, 962 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1992) (the 
defendant, as a condition of supervised release, was 
prohibited from associating with her fiancee because she 
had acted recklessly and endangered the community at 
large in a high-speed chase to protect her fiancee from 
arrest); United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 
1990) (defendant, a city councilman, who had sought 
bribes in exchange for his vote, was prohibited as a 
probation condition from serving in or seeking elected 
public office). 
 
We believe that the District Court carefully considered 
Crandon's prior conduct and the need to protect the public 
and did not abuse its broad discretion when it prohibited 
Crandon from accessing the Internet or other similar 
computer networks without prior approval from the U.S. 
Probation Office. 
 
IV. 
 
Finally, we turn to Crandon's argument regarding the 
sentencing court's application of the cross-reference in 
U.S.S.G. S 2G2.2, which increased the base offense level by 
eight points. Crandon argues that the District Court erred 
in assigning him a base offense level of 25 as outlined in 
section 2G2.1 pursuant to the cross-reference as outlined 
in section 2G2.2(c)(1). The standard of review of the District 
Court's interpretation and application of the Sentencing 
Guidelines is plenary. See United States v. Hallman, 23 
F.3d 821, 823 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
It is undisputed that since Crandon pleaded guilty to 
violating 18 U.S.C. S 2252(a)(2), the Sentencing Guidelines 
direct that U.S.S.G. S 2G2.2 be applied.4 The issue before 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. 18 U.S.C. S 2252(a)(2) provides that: 
 
       (a) Any person who -- 
 
        (2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction that 
       has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in interstate 
or 
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us turns on whether or not the cross-reference contained in 
U.S.S.G. S 2G2.2(c) applies. The cross-reference states, in 
relevant part: 
 
       If the offense involved causing, transporting, 
       permitting, or offering or seeking by notice or 
       advertisement, a minor to engage in sexually explicit 
       conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction 
       of such conduct, apply S 2G2.1. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 2G2.2(c)(1). 
 
Crandon raises two objections, but we will focus on his 
argument that the court erred in refusing to consider his 
purpose or state of mind to determine whether the cross- 
reference is applicable.5 At sentencing, the District Court 
stated that "the Sentencing Commission did not intend for 
the defendant's state of mind to be subject to interpretation 
when applying the cross-reference." App. at 55. 
Accordingly, the court refused to inquire into Crandon's 
purpose, motivation or intent. 
 
The government argues that Crandon's intent is 
completely irrelevant to the application of the cross- 
reference. In fact, the government contends that the only 
relevant consideration should be Crandon's conduct: the 
fact that he "permitted" the girl to engage in sexually 
explicit activity and took pictures of that activity. Indeed, at 
oral argument, the government maintained that any person 
who takes such a picture a fortiori has the purpose of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       foreign commerce, or which contains materials which have been 
       mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by 
       computer, or knowingly reproduces any visual depiction for 
       distribution in interstate or foreign commerce by any means 
       including by computer or through the mails, if -- 
 
       (A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a 
       minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and 
 
       (B) such visual depiction is of such conduct . . . shall be 
       punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section. 
 
5. We reject Crandon's argument that the language of the cross-reference 
only pertains to crimes promulgated by "notice or advertisement." A 
plain reading of the cross-reference reveals that the phrase "by notice or 
advertisement" does not modify "permitting" or "causing." 
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producing a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct, 
regardless of what the defendant may have to say about his 
or her state of mind. The government also acknowledged at 
oral argument that its view would give rise to a form of 
strict liability for the photographer, in terms of the 
application of S 2G2.2(c)(1), so long as the photograph 
depicts the proscribed sexually explicit conduct. We think 
the issue invites a bit more inquiry than the government's 
rigid position would allow. 
 
We believe the District Court erred in determining that 
Crandon acted "for the purpose of producing a visual 
depiction of [sexually explicit] conduct" without permitting 
any actual examination or consideration of his purpose. 
U.S.S.G. S 2G2.2(c)(1) (emphasis added). It is simply not 
enough to say "the photo speaks for itself and for the 
defendant, and that is the end of the matter," as the 
government's position would dictate, when the statute 
makes specific reference to the defendant's purpose in 
taking the photograph. Recalling the presumption against 
strict liability in criminal law, see Morissette v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-63 (1952), it is critically 
important to be certain that the defendant's purpose was, 
in fact, to create pornographic pictures. Crandon contends 
that his purpose in taking the pictures was the 
memorialization of his love for the girl, which had 
progressed to sexual intimacy, rather than the 
photographing of sexually explicit conduct. See Appellant's 
Br. at 25. Crandon thus posits a purpose arguably different 
from that proscribed by the statute. We think it at least 
deserves to be heard. Whether it is believed or not, or 
whether the distinction ultimately even makes any 
difference, is an entirely different matter. Though doubtful, 
it is conceivable that Crandon did have alternative, perhaps 
even multitudinous, purposes in taking the photographs. 
For instance, Crandon took approximately 48 pictures of 
the girl on his July visit. Two were sexual in nature, while 
the remaining photographs were not. Set in context, this 
fact could support his contention that his purpose in taking 
the photos was the memorialization of their time together or 
his love for her -- a purpose other than producing sexually 
explicit material. Our point is that some inquiry should 
have been made into Crandon's purpose, motivation or 
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intent so that the District Court could make an informed 
assessment as to the applicability of the cross-reference. 
 
The government relies on United States v. Jones, 994 
F.2d 456, 458 (8th Cir. 1993) and United States v. Harvey, 
2 F.3d 1318, 1326 (3d Cir. 1993) to support its contention 
that intent or state of mind is irrelevant when applying 
section 2G2.2(c)(1). However, we do not read these cases to 
support a conclusion that conduct may supplant a 
consideration of purpose. In Jones, the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed an application of the cross-reference when Jones 
took photographs depicting a nine-year old girl lying on a 
bed with her genitals exposed. See Jones, 994 F.2d at 458. 
The Jones court wrote, "[defendant's] conduct in taking the 
photographs was done in preparation for his commission of 
the offense of conviction of receiving the photographs, and 
thus, was properly considered by the District Court in 
applying the cross-reference provision of Guidelines 
S 2G2.2." Id. at 459. In United States v. Harvey, we 
permitted the cross-reference to stand when the facts 
indicated that the pictures were part of a cataloged library 
of photographs documenting the defendant's extensive 
sexual contact with a variety of children.6 See Harvey, 2 
F.3d at 1326. Harvey "took yearly trips to the Phillippines 
to solicit and engage minors in sexually explicit conduct 
. . ." Id. He recorded these activities on several hundred 
index cards, some of which indicated he had taken 
photographs of the children in the course of abusing them. 
Among the pictures he was convicted of possessing were 
the pictures he took of himself and the minors engaged in 
sexually explicit conduct. The Harvey court concluded that 
"Harvey caused or permitted a minor to engage in sexually 
explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual 
depiction of such conduct" and applied the cross-reference. 
Id. However, there is no evidence that the courts in Jones 
or Harvey refused to or failed to consider the defendant's 
intent. Moreover, the facts of these cases clearly support a 
finding that the defendant caused the victim to engage in 
sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of photographing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318 (3d Cir. 1993), involved an 
identical cross-reference in 2G2.4(c)(1) for possession of child 
pornography. 
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such conduct. Harvey's catalog system and extensive 
collection of child pornography demonstrate that his 
primary purpose was to create the photos; Crandon's 
purpose is not so clear. 
 
To determine whether a cross-reference applies, the court 
must consider all relevant conduct. See U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3(a); 
see also United States v. Salemo, 61 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 
1995). In determining whether to apply the cross-reference 
of S 2G2.2(c)(1), courts must consider the defendant's state 
of mind to ensure that the defendant acted "for the purpose 
of producing a visual depiction of [sexually explicit] 
conduct." 
 
The cross-reference was inserted into the guideline to 
address "offenses more appropriately treated under section 
2G2.1" which deals with the production of sexually 
exploitative material. See United States Sentencing 
Commission, 55 Fed. Reg. 19188, 19199 (1990). We think 
it may be possible for an individual to willfully take a 
sexually explicit photograph, but not for the purpose of 
producing sexually explicit material warranting a section 
2G2.1 base level. Whether this is such a case is for the 
District Court to determine. In addressing this question, 
the court should consider Crandon's purpose or intent in 
taking the photographs before applying the cross-reference. 
Since the sentencing court made no such inquiry, we will 
vacate the District Court's application of the cross-reference 
and remand to the District Court for resentencing. 
 
V. 
 
To summarize, we will affirm Crandon's sentence with 
regard to the restitution and condition of supervised 
release. However, on the application of the cross-reference 
in U.S.S.G. S 2G2.2(c)(1), we will vacate the term of 
imprisonment and remand for resentencing consistent with 
this opinion. 
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